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Civil Society Organizations,
Participation and Budgeting
Larry Willmore20
To reach the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations, govern-
ments must obtain access to more resources; more important, they must employ 
what funds they have wisely and with purpose. Increased spending on education, 
for example, will not help achieve the goal of universal primary education if funds 
are spent on secondary and higher education, or on primary schools in wealthy dis-
tricts where attendance is nearly universal. International donors and multinational 
agencies alike are disappointed with budgets produced by the traditional political 
process. Donors are encouraging, and increasingly mandating, direct participa-
tion by civil society organisations at various stages of the budget process, from 
drafting to auditing. (See OECD, 2001; World Bank, 2000b; UNDP, n.d.) e 
expectations are that participatory budgeting will lead to greater transparency, to 
enhanced accountability and, above all, to pro-poor results. 
is paper provides an introduction by deﬁning terms and concepts. It ad-
dresses ﬁrst the question, what is civil society? e term is used in varied ways 
by diﬀerent writers, which makes communication diﬃcult and impedes clarity 
of thought. Second, the chapter attempts to categorise and synthesizes the many 
ways that civil society participates in the budget process.
WHAT IS CIVIL SOCIETY?21
Civil society is a very old idea that has experienced a massive global revival in the 
past three decades. Nonetheless, it is not always clear what proponents of civil 
society mean by the term.22 Indeed, the very fuzziness of the term accounts for 
much of its universal appeal. Table 1.1 summarizes nine representative deﬁnitions, 
ranging from the ancient to the modern.
When people speak of ‘civil society’ today, they are almost always referring 
to social associations that exist outside of and independent from institutions of 
government. e term did not always have this meaning. For ancient Romans and 
20  Adil Khan provided helpful comments on earlier drafts and greatly improved the ﬁnal product, 
but the author alone is responsible for all views and opinions expressed.
21  is section draws on Glasius (2001).
22  is is equally true of the related term ‘social capital’, for which “no social science has managed 
to impose a deﬁnition … that captures what diﬀerent researchers mean by it within a discipline, 
let alone across ﬁelds” (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). For a detailed and critical review, see 
Ponthieux (2003).
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Greeks, civil society was an intrinsic part of the state since, for them, participation 
in political institutions is what deﬁned a people as civilized rather than barbarian. 
e Scottish Enlightenment thinker Adam Ferguson in 1767 sought to rekindle 
the Roman idea of civic virtue in An Essay on the History of Civil Society. Ferguson 
was concerned that citizens of his day were devoting too much energy to personal 
aﬀairs and too little to aﬀairs of state. 
e German philosopher Georg Hegel (1770-1831) read Ferguson with in-
terest, but radically redeﬁned the concept of civil society. For Hegel, civil society 
consists of all social and economic interactions of men operating outside the state 
and outside the family. Hegel continues to inﬂuence thinking on this topic to this 
very day. e Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics (McLean and McMillan, 2003), 
for example, deﬁnes ‘civil society’ in the following Hegelian way:
e set of intermediate associations which are neither the state nor 
the (extended) family; civil society therefore includes voluntary as-
sociations and ﬁrms and other corporate bodies. e term has been 
used with diﬀerent meanings by various writers since the eight-
eenth century, but this main current usage is derived from Hegel. 
Table 1.1
DEFINITIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY
Source Denition
Ancient Greeks and 
Romans, revived by 
Adam Ferguson in 
18th century
Participation in political (civic) life, by voting, holding 
oce, etc. Motives are altruistic, so this denition 
excludes ‘uncivil’ participation for personal gain.
Georg Hegel All voluntary associations outside the state and outside 
the family, including business rms. Participants are 
motivated by collective well-being or personal gain.
Karl Marx Follows Hegel, but motivation of participants is 
exclusively self-interest, never collective well-being.
Antonio Gramsci 
(1930s)
Associations that stand between the economic 
structure and the state. Excludes the economic sphere 
itself, but includes employers’ associations and 
trade unions, as well as political parties, recreational 
associations and non-government cultural institutions.
Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1835), 
revived by 
Robert Putnam 
(1993, 2000)
All voluntary associations and social networks that 
make up the ‘social capital’ of society. Includes 
professional associations, choral societies, bridge 
clubs, family picnics. Excludes activity for purely 
private and commercial purposes, such as 
business rms, but includes family activities.
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World Bank (2000b) Denes civil society narrowly as “not-for-prot 
organizations and special interest groups, either formal or 
informal, working to improve the lives of their constituents.”
UNDP (n.d.) Follows Gramsci by dening civil society as “non-state 
associations whose main aims are neither to generate 
prots nor to seek governing power”, adding that they 
operate “outside both the market and the state”.
UNU-IAS (2004) All actors—organised or unorganised—who 
“promote the goals of sustainable development”. 
Groups that “often represent certain business interests” 
are explicitly excluded, as is ‘uncivil society’.
UNDP (2004) Voluntary associations other than political 
parties, the military, business rms, trade 
unions, churches, news media and intellectuals
Hegel shared Ferguson’s concern that much of the activity of citizens is 
motivated by narrow self-interest rather than the public good, but he chose not to 
deﬁne civil society on the basis of the motivation of those who participate in it.
Karl Marx (1818-1883), who was deeply inﬂuenced by Hegel, regarded civil 
society as bourgeois society, so thought it self-evident that everyone at all times 
was pursuing his or her self-interest. Marx thus reduced civil society to its eco-
nomic dimension because he found it inconceivable that any individual or group 
would promote broad interests of society as a whole. As Glasius (2001, p. 2) notes, 
had Marx’s view “remained the prevailing idea about what civil society is, we 
would not be talking about it today.” 
e Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, writing his Prison Notebooks in the 1930s, 
went back to Hegel, but eliminated from Hegel’s broad deﬁnition of civil society 
the economic sphere itself, i.e. ﬁrms and corporations organized for the purpose 
of proﬁting from production and trade. Civil society, for Gramsci, stands between 
the state and the economic structure. It consists of recreational associations such as 
chess clubs, and cultural institutions such as churches, choral societies and schools, 
but it also includes political parties and representatives of the economic sphere such 
as chambers of commerce, producers’ associations and trade unions. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, dissidents struggling against the authoritarian 
regimes of Latin America and Central Europe embraced the ideas of Gramsci. His 
depiction of civil society as ‘non-family, non-state and non-proﬁt’ was strategically 
useful in countries where the church could be subversive as well as supportive of 
the established order. From Latin America and Central Europe, the idea of civil 
society spread widely, even to wealthy countries with no recent history of dictator-
ship, and was seen as a way to breathe life into apathetic citizens. 
Putnam (1993, 2000), drawing on Tocqueville (1835), includes in civil 
society (labelled by him as ‘civic community’) family activities such as dinners and 
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picnics in addition to all the non-state and non-proﬁt associations of Gramsci. e 
views of Putnam and other ‘neo-Toquevillians’ overlap those of Gramsci, although 
they never cite the Italian writer as an authority. Neo-Toquevillians and follow-
ers of Gramsci alike have come to regard civic engagement as necessary to build 
‘social capital’ to sustain democracy and good governance. e key diﬀerence is 
that Gramsci, following Hegel, speciﬁcally excludes family activities, whereas the 
neo-Toquevillians include them. A core belief, in words of Putnam (2000, p. 338) 
is that “associations and less formal networks of civic engagement instil in their 
members habits of cooperation and public-spiritedness, as well as the practical 
skills necessary to partake in public life”. Not everyone agrees. Sceptics point to 
examples of vibrant civil societies that were not democratic, such as fascist Italy 
and Nazi Germany (Berman, 1997), and to examples of functioning democracies 
whose citizens are not particularly active in civil society organisations, such as 
Costa Rica (Bräutigam, 2004). 
If academics fail to agree on what constitutes civil society, the same is true 
for practitioners in international organisations. e World Bank (2000b, p. 8) ex-
cludes for-proﬁt ﬁrms when it deﬁnes civil society as “not-for-proﬁt organizations 
and special interest groups, either formal or informal, working to improve the 
lives of their constituents.” Confusingly, the President of the World Bank in 1999 
included a government institution—parliament—in civil society23, but no one has 
followed up on this idea. UNDP’s Civil Society Organizations and Participatory 
Programme (CSOPP), in the spirit of Gramsci, deﬁnes civil society more narrowly 
by excluding all associations, for-proﬁt or not-for-proﬁt, that sell goods and serv-
ices in the market. For CSOPP, civil society organisations (CSOs) are “non-state 
associations whose main aims are neither to generate proﬁts nor to seek governing 
power,” and operate “outside both the market and the state” (UNDP, n.d.). Aca-
demics often follow this deﬁnition. Anheier and Carlson (2002, p. 2), for example, 
view “civil society as a sphere located between state and market—a buﬀer zone 
strong enough to keep both state and market in check, thereby preventing each 
from becoming too powerful and dominating.” 
e United Nations University Institute of Advanced Studies has issued “An 
Agenda for Research” for its Sustainable Development Governance programme, in 
which civil society has a prominent place. e Report, titled Engaging the Disenfran-
chised—Developing Countries and Civil Society in International Governance for Sus-
tainable Development, recognizes the importance of deﬁning the term ‘civil society’:
“In turning to a discussion of civil society disenfranchisement, the 
deﬁnition of who comprises civil society must be clear. ough 
there are widely diﬀering deﬁnitions of civil society, in this report, 
the term here refers to “a self–organised citizenry.” is deﬁnition 
includes both civil society groups—such as non–governmental 
organisations, transnational advocacy networks, grassroots groups 
23  “e list of participants in civil society is great, including, of course, elected parliamentary 
assemblies, which are included also in the government sector” (Wolfensohn, 1999, p. 26).
Civil Society Organizations, Participation and Budgeting 23
and issue coalitions—as well as actors not aﬃliated with a speciﬁc 
organisation, such as protesters.” (UNU-IAS, 2004, p. 8).
Civil society as “self-organized citizenry” would seem to exclude citizens who 
are not organized; nonetheless, with apparent contradiction, the UNU-IAS report 
explicitly includes unorganized protesters as part of civil society. e deﬁnition 
would seem also to include business ﬁrms, which are self-organized, albeit for 
the purpose of earning proﬁts. Yet the Report explicitly excludes not only private 
business, but also associations such as chambers of commerce that represent the 
interests of private business:
“ough there will be some treatment of the interaction of so–
called ‘business groups’ which often represent certain business 
interests in this project, these groups are not included in this 
deﬁnition of civil society. Moreover, this deﬁnition will sidestep 
the normative questions of so–called ‘uncivil society’, and focus 
only on those groups who [sic] mission is to promote the goals of 
sustainable development.” (footnote 8, p. 24)
By this deﬁnition, civil society is always good because its members are carry-
ing out good works. But who decides whether a group or an individual is promot-
ing the goals of sustainable development? No one admits to obstructing sustain-
able development and most people —especially owners of business ﬁrms— would 
argue that they promote it by providing jobs, products and services. e UNU-
IAS comes perilously close to deﬁning as civil ‘those citizens who actively support 
our political agenda’ while relegating all others to the category of uncivil. Such a 
deﬁnition would be very subjective: a group that is labelled ‘civil’ by some might 
be labelled ‘uncivil’ by others, solely because of diﬀerences in political philosophy. 
Civility, like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder.
e UNDP report, Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens’ Democra-
cy, refers often to ‘civil society’. (As of August 2004 the Report is available only in 
Spanish, but an English translation is forthcoming.) A main concern of the Report 
is that, despite signiﬁcant political advances over the last 25 years, democratic re-
gimes are under threat in Latin America. An opinion poll of 18,643 citizens in 18 
countries reveals that “54.7 per cent of Latin Americans would be willing to accept 
an authoritarian government if this could resolve the economic situation” (p. 31). 
e Report asserts that increased support for democracy requires implementation 
of “strategies to strengthen civil society and its articulation with the State and 
political parties” (p. 28). An entire text box (no. 32, on p. 123) is devoted to “e 
Role of Civil Society”. Alas, ‘civil society’ is not deﬁned, so it is not clear what, 
precisely, the authors of the Report are referring. 
e closest the UNDP report comes to providing readers with a clear deﬁni-
tion is a suggestion (p. 67) that civil society is made up of “voluntary associations”. 
is seems to be the broad deﬁnition of Hegel, which would include business ﬁrms, 
but much later it becomes evident that this is not the case. A much more restricted 
deﬁnition of ‘civil society’ is evident from the way the Report describes the leaders 
its staﬀ surveyed in 18 countries of Latin America. Of the 231 leaders interviewed, 
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“51 per cent are politicians. ere are also important numbers of 
businessmen (11 per cent) and intellectuals (14 per cent). e 
remaining interviews are distributed among trade union leaders 
(7 per cent), journalists (6 per cent), civil society leaders (7 per 
cent), clerics (2.5 per cent) and members of the military (1.5 per 
cent).” (p. 155)
Implicitly then, for the authors of this Report, civil society excludes political 
parties, the military, private business, trade unions, religious associations, the news 
media and intellectuals. Yet, one cannot be certain that the same deﬁnition is ap-
plied consistently throughout the Report.
Given the myriad of deﬁnitions in use, it behoves every writer to explain precisely 
what he or she means by ‘civil society’, or refrain from using the term. Unless other-
wise noted, we use ‘civil society’ in the Hegelian sense, meaning voluntary associations 
that are not part of the state or the extended family. Each civil society organisation, 
and its members, may be seeking to advance broad social interests, narrow group in-
terests, or even narrower individual interests (pecuniary or recreational).
WHAT KIND OF PARTICIPATION?
It is useful to think of budget proposals (plans for government taxation and ex-
penditure) as taking two forms: top-down (under the control of government) and 
bottom-up (initiated by citizens and associations of citizens). Proposals in either 
direction might go through parliament (the legislative assembly) or they might 
bypass parliament entirely. is gives rise to four ‘models’ or types of participation, 
as shown in table 1.2.
Table 1.2
VARIETIES OF PARTICIPATION
TOP-DOWN
(government-led)
BOTTOM-UP
(civil society-driven)
Participation 
through 
parliament
Established political parties •Grassroots political parties
•South Africa People’s Budget
•Canada Alternative Budget
•Special interest groups
Participation 
that by-passes 
parliament
• Popular referenda, 
plebiscites
•Ireland’s National Economic 
and Social Council (NESC)
•Brazil’s participatory 
budgeting
•Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP)
Citizen initiatives (Switzerland 
and some states of 
the United States)
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e upper-left quadrant of table 1.2 (top-down, through parliament) is the 
usual relationship between a democratic government and its citizens, one that is 
increasingly seen as inadequate. Citizens are consulted by members of the ruling 
party only at election time, when they have the opportunity to voice their concerns 
and, indeed, express discontent by voting for an opposition candidate. Between 
elections, there is little dialogue between government and citizens.
In many countries there exist small, grassroots political parties that might 
focus on a single issue, such as the Green Party, Libertarian Party, Flat Tax Party 
or Marijuana Party. ere is considerable civic participation in these parties at 
all times, though, admittedly, the pace does speed up during elections. Political 
leaders of such parties are close to their constituents and are almost always in 
opposition to government, so are classed in the quadrant of table 1.2 that lists 
‘bottom-up’ approaches to reform of representative democracy.
Another bottom-up approach is for groups of concerned citizens to work speciﬁ-
cally for budget reform. Typically these groups receive backing from other civil society 
organisations, such as trade unions and religious associations. e People’s Budget in 
South Africa and alternative budgets in Canada are well-known examples of this type 
of civic action, and similar groups are active in countries around the world (Krafchick, 
2004). Like grassroots political parties, budget groups work closely with citizens, both 
to learn about their problems and to educate voters, who gain a better appreciation 
of how government policies aﬀect them. Rather than bypass parliament, these groups 
attempt to transform it, and would like nothing more than for their budget proposals 
to be accepted by government or by an opposition party. In at least one instance, in 
Manitoba, Canada, this happened. A social-democratic party (the New Democratic 
Party) adopted the alternative budget as its own and then went on to win general elec-
tions and form a government. e budget group disbanded after 11 years of working 
together; it had reached its goal so there was no further need for its existence. (See the 
ﬂoor discussion following the paper of Loxley in Part Two.)
Box 1.1
TWO VIEWS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY
The fundamental paradigm that dominates our politics is the shift from 
representational to direct democracy. Voters want to run the show directly and 
are impatient with all forms of intermediaries between their opinions and public 
policy. This basic shift stems from a profusion of information on the one hand, and a 
determined distrust of institutions and politicians on the other. 
—Dick Morris, 1999.
Since the greatest popular support for direct democracy is located among citizens at 
the periphery of politics —the less interested, the less informed, and the adherents of 
extreme parties— these reforms might encourage the nativist and populist tendencies 
that exist in Europe today. Aspects of the Swiss and American experiences suggest that 
direct democracy can provide a tool for majority action against unpopular minorities. 
—Russell J. Dalton, Wilhelm Bürklin, and Andrew Drummond, 2001
.
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A more radical way to deal with a poorly functioning parliament is to bypass 
it altogether by moving to direct democracy. When citizens are free to place any 
initiative on the ballot, provided they collect enough signatures, this can lead to 
active civil society participation. Advocates of this ‘bottom-up’ approach argue 
that it is “particularly eﬀective in raising trust between citizens and government”, 
thus contributing to social capital (Frey, 2003, p.2). ere is evidence from the 
cantons of Switzerland that direct democracy produces an increase in perceived 
well-being on the part of citizens, though not on the part of non-voting foreign 
residents (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). On the other hand, citizens who distrust politi-
cal parties may use initiatives as a way of bypassing weak parties rather than work-
ing to strengthen them (Wyss and Widmer, 2001). Moreover, there is no evidence 
minorities or the poor are favoured by taxation and spending decisions passed by 
a majority of the electorate. (See Box 1.1.) On the contrary, there is evidence that 
“pro-poor participation works best through organizations, including political par-
ties and membership-based groups” (Goldsmith, 2004).
When government decides the issues that are to be put to a vote, the popular 
consultation is known as a referendum. If voters are asked to express an opinion on 
matters already decided by government, the consultation is known as a plebiscite. 
Plebiscites and referenda rarely concern issues of the budget, but tend instead to 
address more general issues such as the decision to join a free trade or currency 
area, or to approve a new constitution. is top-down approach appears to be 
democratic, since it gives citizens the right to cast a vote on important issues, but 
in practice is often used by authoritarian leaders to circumvent, thus weaken, an 
already weak legislature (Barczak, 2001).
Sometimes governments submit issues not to the entire electorate, but rather 
to a select group of civil society organisations that they invite to the negotiating ta-
ble. is is known as the corporatist model of governance, which has been applied 
with considerable success in Ireland (Brinkerhoﬀ and Goldsmith, 2001, annex 1). 
In 1973 the Government of Ireland created the NESC (National Social and Eco-
nomic Council), inviting a small number of employer and business organisations, 
trade unions and farm organisations to join. Beginning in 1987, NESC mem-
bers discussed and reached agreements on wage levels and other macroeconomic 
variables for successive periods of three years. is macroeconomic consensus was 
extremely valuable, as it allowed the country to restore competitiveness, maintain 
industrial peace, and promote private investment and growth. ese economic 
policies were successful in terms of growth, but they were not particularly pro-
poor, reﬂecting the conspicuous absence from the negotiating table of representa-
tives of unorganized workers, women and the unemployed. is began to change 
somewhat beginning in 1996 when community and voluntary organisations were 
added. A deeper criticism remains: the government is still very much in control of 
NESC negotiations, which bypass and weaken parliament, thus undermining the 
established democratic process.
A number of Brazil’s states and municipalities are experimenting with an 
alternative top-down approach, known as participatory budgeting. roughout 
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the year, citizens have the opportunity to participate in public forums designed to 
“confront Brazilian political legacies of clientelism, social exclusion, and corruption 
by making the budgetary process transparent, open, and public” (Wampler, 2000, 
p. 2). ose who attend these forums elect representatives to regional meetings 
that in turn elect citizen-delegates to a budget council that works directly with 
government. Participatory budgeting began in 1989 in Porto Alegre, the capital of 
Rio Grande do Sul, and by June of 2000 had spread to nearly 100 municipalities 
and ﬁve states.
e initial results of participatory budgeting, especially in Porto Alegre, were 
promising and attracted widespread attention. An important result is that the pub-
lic meetings act as “citizenship schools” where community ties are strengthened 
and participants learn about their rights and their duties as citizens. Excluded 
citizens acquire voice—a right, for the ﬁrst time, to make demands in public. In 
successful cases of participatory budgeting, there is also increased social spending 
in poorer neighbourhoods and improved transparency in public works projects. 
(See Wampler, 2000)
Although participatory budgeting is useful as a tool to promote political in-
clusion and social justice, it is no panacea. Brian Wampler (2000), a sympathetic 
observer, describes numerous limitations of programmes in Brazil: 
Elected members of city councils and state legislatures “have virtually no 
role in the policymaking procedure” because “the transfer of authority to 
citizens’ forums bypasses the legislative branch” (p. 18).
“Participants … do not propose and debate their own policies but focus on 
the government’s pre-existing policies” (p. 16).
Most citizens are poorly informed and lack expertise. As a result, “broad 
policy decisions may be largely acts of rubberstamping as the majority of 
participants follow the lead of the most experienced policy advocates or the 
positions of the government” (p. 16). is might change with time, but it 
is not clear whether public learning is occurring or whether “participation 
is being used to legitimize the policy choices of the government” (p. 17).
Government remains the principal actor and tends to use its power to re-
ward “friendly” participants. “is does little to empower citizens and may 
just be a new form of clientelism” (p. 23).
Participatory budgeting can be manipulated by government to advance its 
own agenda, through “non-disclosure of key information, the lack of imple-
mentation of selected public policies, or the weakening of citizen oversight 
committees”. is is more than a hypothetical concern, for “programmes in 
Brazil … have been rejected by social movements and NGOs [non-govern-
mental organizations] due to the government’s interference” (p. 24).
e focus is on public works and once a particular project is completed, 
people lose interest and stop participating (p. 23).
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Participants often are interested only in short to medium term public 
works, and ﬁnd it diﬃcult to fathom the complexities of long-term plan-
ning (pp. 23-24).
Emphasis is on local issues and local budgets whereas “the principal prob-
lems their communities face are often related to unemployment, violence, 
or the lack of educational opportunities.” Solutions to these global prob-
lems lie “far beyond the scope of participatory budgeting” (p. 24).
Even when participatory budgeting is successful, we cannot be certain wheth-
er this is due to the programme itself or to the ideology of the government in 
power. In the words of Wampler (2000, p. 27):
“It is not clear whether the increase in social spending stems from 
the PB [participatory budgeting] program or whether the in-
crease results from the political ideology of the progressive gov-
ernment. While it is impossible to neatly separate the political 
agenda of the progressive government from the workings of the 
PB, it is vital to note that PB programs tend to co-exist with 
signiﬁcant changes in the social spending”.
But surely it is possible to separate in some rough fashion the eﬀects of partici-
patory budgeting from the eﬀects of ideology. A social science experiment is going 
on in Brazil at this very moment, for more than 100 municipalities and states that 
have implemented some type of participatory budgeting, and not all of these gov-
ernments are controlled by parties with a ‘progressive’ political ideology.
Wampler and Avritzer (2004) focus on this ideological diversity by analysing 
participatory budgeting in three Brazilian municipalities: Porto Alegre (1.2 mil-
lion residents), Belo Horizonte (2 million residents) and Recife (1.8 million resi-
dents). Participatory budgeting was very successful in Porto Alegre and Belo Hori-
zonte, but “less-than successful” in Recife. It so happens that left-wing political 
parties control the governments of Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte: the Workers’ 
Party (PT) in the case of Porto Alegre, and “a leftist-progressive coalition that 
includes the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) and the Workers’ Party” in the case of 
Belo Horizonte. Recife, in contrast, has been governed by “the Party of the Brazil-
ian Democratic Movement (PMDB), a centrist-catch-all party, and the Liberal 
Front Party (PFL), a traditional, clientelistic party”. e researchers conclude that 
“clientilism continues to be associated with Recife’s PB as public oﬃcials circum-
vent the new institutional format in order to secure speciﬁc resources for their 
constituents”. We cannot be sure without information on programmes in other 
states and municipalities, but the evidence so far supports the conjecture of Bräu-
tigam (2004) that participatory budgeting requires “direction and commitment 
from a left-of-center political party in order to make it genuinely pro-poor.”
In September of 1999 the World Bank and the IMF endorsed participatory 
budgeting as part of a new Comprehensive Development Framework, and man-
dated civil society organisation (CSO) participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs). e PRSP is the operational expression of the Comprehensive 
•
•
Civil Society Organizations, Participation and Budgeting 29
Development Framework in low-income countries. To apply for concessional 
assistance or HIPC (“highly indebted poor countries”) debt relief, an eligible 
country must draft a PRSP with the participation of civil society. is require-
ment applies, then, to about 70 low-income countries. For a country to receive 
concessional assistance or debt relief, the World Bank and the IMF must endorse 
its PRSP.
Box 1.2
MANDATING CSO PARTICIPATION: EXPECTATIONS
[S]trong civil society organizations can promote the political empowerment of 
poor people, pressuring the state to better serve their interests and increasing the 
eectiveness of antipoverty programs.
—World Bank, 2000a.
The World Bank’s partnership with civil society is built upon the recognition that civil 
society organizations often have closer contact with the poor and can oer valuable 
insights and perspectives that dier from other stakeholders. CSOs may be better able 
than government or ocial actors to help the poor …. The World Bank is committed 
to helping civil society and governments … eectively engage each other … [and] has 
increased its own capacity to engage civil society …. 
—World Bank, 2000b.
By mandating CSO participation in PRSPs, the World Bank was following 
the advice of scholars such as Putnam (1993, 2000) who argue that civil society 
builds social capital and fosters democracy by giving citizens an opportunity to 
abandon narrow (private) self-interests and work for the common (public) good, 
the common good in this instance being the goal of reduced poverty. In addition, 
there existed a strong belief, or at least a hope, that CSOs could empower the poor. 
(See box 1.2.)
e PRSP process has disappointed those who predicted large gains for the 
poor and inarticulate. Two researchers from the University of Antwerp, Nadia 
Molenaers and Robrecht Renard (2003), describe in some detail the disappointing 
results for Bolivia. ey point out that “the recent boom in associations in ird 
World countries is not unrelated to the international funding opportunities the 
donor community has made available. A lot of civil society organisations (espe-
cially NGOs) are donor-bred and fed, hence the strength of organised civil society 
may be to that extent artiﬁcial and not embedded/rooted in the society in question” 
(p. 152). In any case, “the participation process was all along a government-led 
process” (p. 143) that excluded “the poor, civil society organisations out of favour 
with government, trade unions, indigenous communities, women’s groups, and 
also extremely important institutions for democracy — like Parliament” (p. 151). 
Bolivia, it is important to bear in mind, is held in high regard as a PRSP success 
story. e outcome of the PRSP consultations in other countries has generally 
been worse. (See box 1.3.)
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Box 1.3
MANDATING CSO PARTICIPATION: PITFALLS
Experience with participatory processes suggests that the poor and the marginalized, 
even when invited to express their views, have no institutional outlet through which 
to follow up. In these circumstances, elected institutions have a key role to play in 
providing the vehicle through which their views are represented. Ad-hoc consultations 
can often be seen as little more than a justication for governments to validate their 
pre-set priorities. …. [W]ithout a clear and transparent link to elected institutions, 
[they] should not be encouraged.
—World Bank, 2001
In participative processes, the absence of vulnerable groups, the excluded and the 
poor is, in fact, not surprising. … [P]oor people tend to be poorly organised, remain 
relatively voiceless … and are quite reluctant to inuence processes of policy-making 
aecting broader social groupings. …. [E]ven when the poor participate, participation 
might actually conrm the clientelist structures in circumstances where the poor are 
highly dependent upon non-poor groups.
—Nadia Molenaers and Robrecht Renard, 2003.
In September of 2001 the Secretariat of the Comprehensive Development 
Framework (CDF) reviewed the experience of 46 countries, many of which, though 
not all, were low-income, so involved in the PRSP process. e report claims that 
“sustained progress has been made”, but concedes that “implementation of the 
[CDF] principles has been diﬃcult and uneven among these countries, not least 
because most of them are among the poorest countries of the world” (World Bank, 
2001, p. 2). e CDF Secretariat laments that parliaments are absent from the 
political debate and recognize that the participatory process did not empower the 
poor. It recommends that in future civic participation be linked to elected legisla-
tive bodies, or not be encouraged at all. (See box 1.3, and World Bank, 2001, p. 
4.) Two years later, the CDF Secretariat was still complaining that “consultations 
have tended to involve civil society—either citizens or their organizations—more 
than parliamentarians or the private sector” (World Bank, 2003, p.15).24
In March of 2002 the staﬀ of the World Bank and IMF (2002) reviewed in 
considerable detail the experiences of the ten countries that had completed and 
submitted their PRSPs by January of that year.25 e authors were concerned that 
participation is not representative: “In some countries, not all sectoral ministries 
have been fully involved. More generally, engagement of direct representatives 
of the poor themselves has not been common. Such groups include parliaments; 
CSOs that are out of favor with the government; stakeholders outside of capitals, 
local government oﬃcials and private sector representatives; trade unions; and 
women’s groups” (p. 22). e Review stresses in particular the limited role of 
24  Note the implicit exclusion of parliament and the private sector from civil society.
25  e countries are Albania, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Honduras, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Tanzania, and Uganda. By January of 2003 eleven more countries had 
submitted PRSPs.
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parliaments in the PRSP process, and points out that this “has been an expressed 
concern of other recent World Bank reports, such as those on the CDF, and of a 
number of development partners—including the Utstein group of bilateral donors 
(UK, Netherlands, Germany, and Norway) and the EC—as well as of individual 
members of parliament themselves …” (p. 23).
CONCLUSION 
Four years ago there was near consensus in the development community that it is 
possible for civil society to move budgets to a pro-poor position. In this spirit the 
World Bank, in its ﬂagship World Development Report 2000, wrote:
“[S]trong civil society organizations can promote the political 
empowerment of poor people, pressuring the state to better 
serve their interests and increasing the eﬀectiveness of antipover-
ty programs. Case studies in the Indian state of Kerala and else-
where show that a highly engaged civil society contributes to 
better outcomes in health and education. What is needed is an 
enabling institutional environment for civil society to develop 
and thicken”. (World Bank, 2000a, p. 114)
Disillusionment set in quickly, at the World Bank and elsewhere. e tone of 
the World Development Report 2004 is much less optimistic:
“Terms such as civil society and community are sometimes used too 
casually. People diﬀer in beliefs, hopes, values, identities, and ca-
pabilities. Civil society is often not civil at all; many “communi-
ties” have little in common. Individuals and households may dis-
agree about collective objectives and work to promote their own 
views, both individually and through associations, sometimes at 
the direct expense of others”. (World Bank, 2004, p. 49)
Karl Marx was right. Members of society tend to pursue their own self-inter-
est or, at best, the interests of their extended family or social class. e govern-
ments of Kerala (India) and Porto Alegre (Brazil) practice pro-poor budgeting not 
so much because their respective civil societies are “highly engaged”, but rather 
because the parties in power have a pro-poor ideology.
Budgets implemented by governments whose electoral base is the poor will 
tend to be pro-poor, with or without participation of civil society organisations. 
What about budgets of governments with a diﬀerent electoral base? Is it possible 
for participation of civil society to shift them toward pro-poor taxation and ex-
penditure? e answer appears to be a cautious yes, provided participation is bot-
tom-up rather than top-down and provided the aim is to reform rather than by-
pass an elected legislature. At this very moment, budget groups around the world 
are attempting to inﬂuence existing political parties and, even more importantly, 
to educate the poor so that they understand the implications of existing budgets, 
and become aware of alternative budgets so that they can cast their votes wisely in 
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their own best interest (Loxley, 2004; Krafchik, 2004). A complementary way to 
accomplish the same goal is to ask parliamentary committees to hold hearings on 
the budget and, in the case of low-income countries, on the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Opposition politicians would have a chance to express 
their views, as would a broad range of civil society organisations, including those 
who are working on behalf of the poor. Press coverage of these hearings would 
also help to educate the electorate so that the poor, where allowed to, are able to 
exercise their strongest weapon—the secret vote.
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